The popularity of open innovation as a methodology for sourcing innovation opens a novel perspective on the increasing value of accessing and competing in innovation. When practicing open innovation, organisations face the challenges of identifying useful solutions and partners in a universe that is not confined to the boundaries of the firm. To address these challenges, online open innovation intermediaries have grown in number and achieved a global presence in recent years and this has led to an increasing interest in research that explores their roles and functions.
Introduction
It is difficult to imagine how a society can maintain its well-being without growth and the pursuit of growth is a focal element of much economic policy. In a free market economy, growth is enabled by the competitive exploitation of novel innovations. Since an increasing number of actors are able to operate on the frontiers of technology, the effective exploitation of novel innovations is considered fundamental for competitive advantage.
The need to compete in innovation is behind the popularity of open innovation as a method for opening the search space beyond the boundaries of the firm as a source of innovative solutions and competitiveness. Open innovation suggests that the innovation performance of companies can be enhanced by incorporating innovations created outside the boundaries of the firm to the internal development processes, as well as actively promoting internal innovations that do not match the business model with opportunities outside the firm. In other words, open innovation embraces the process of cultivating and internalising values from opportunities external to the firm, as well as the skilful deployment of internal discoveries to external deployments (Chesbrough, 2003) . Their novelty, rapid growth, and consequent success have led to increasing interest and research in how they provide value for clients.
Specifically, research has offered a broad view of how open innovation intermediaries function and has explored some aspects of their operations in matching innovation supply and demand (Lakhani, 2007; Boudreau et al. 2008; Jeppesen et al. 2010) . However, these intermediaries have different structures due to the various underlying mechanisms that leverage participant incentives for intermediary platform members (solvers and search agents) to increase and direct their participation. There is a lack of research that specifically explores the matching mechanisms used by open innovation intermediaries. Here, we can consider the incentives and behaviour of individual agents as seekers and providers of potential solutions, and how these attributes are embraced, formed, and aligned with the platform infrastructure.
Examining the area of on-line mechanism design in detail, we find some research focused on on-line platforms (Parkes, 2007) and prediction markets (Pennock & Sami, 2007) . However, open innovation intermediaries have not been researched from the point of view of mechanism design. Mechanisms present interesting characteristics because the objectives of the intermediary often cannot be accomplished by exclusively promoting full information revelation. Other aspects need to be considered such as cognitive and behavioural biases, search strategies, information asymmetry, or as in this case, the recombination of ideas through collaboration.
Our analysis employs mechanisms designed to analyse the organisational structure of open innovation intermediaries as platforms utilising privately held information. Mechanism design permits the analysis of incentive-compatibility in the design structure of the platform, identifying potential conflicts and undesirable behaviour. Specifically, we address the following research questions:
• What are some main archetypes of open innovation intermediary mechanisms?
• Which specific processes are supported by these mechanisms?
• What are the underlying tensions, pitfalls, and limitations of these mechanisms?
• What are the consequent managerial implications for the choice and use of open innovation intermediaries?
To address these research questions, we identify several important antecedents of open innovation intermediary mechanisms from a combination of primary data (multiple case studies) and secondary data (from professional, scientific, and online sources). We place the mechanisms along two dimensions of interest: a) their ultimate objectives that range from finding the 'right' connections between actors to finding the 'right' solutions to challenges; b) their level of support for recombination as a basic process for creating innovative solutions.
Our overall findings suggest that information intermediaries are not homogeneous and the underlying mechanisms with which they support their operations vary substantially -more so than the existing literature suggests. Specific findings of this research include:
i.
The identification of five mechanism archetypes: 1) broadcasting search (directed and undirected); 2) brainstorming with ranking (directed and undirected); 3) networking / connect; 4) expert group; and 5) licence-out.
ii.
There is a common tension between autonomy and the use of recombined ideas that can be seen through comments that aim to foster innovation while remaining incentive-compatible. Most of the mechanisms fail to resolve this tension and opt for either using recombination at the cost of letting the agents gain by misrepresenting their valuations of the ideas of others; or using autonomy to circumvent the use of recombinations.
iii. There are certain contradictions between the two extremes of the objective of the mechanisms. At one extreme, we find the phenomenon of using a small number of experts capable of solving well-defined problems. At the opposite end, we find a large numbers of agents who excel at solving ill-defined and unclear problems. Many of the identified mechanisms are situated at a midpoint between both extremes, failing to communicate and engage with either a large number of users or the best experts in specific fields.
iv.
There is a conflict between the use of monetary incentives (i.e. money)
that favour the reuse of existing solutions, and non-monetary incentives 
Literature review

Open innovation intermediaries
The intermediary literature has been examined from various perspectives over the past decades Lakhani et al. 2007 ). The research in this area grew with the rise of a distinctive type of intermediary: innovation intermediaries. Howells (2006) delineates an innovation intermediary as 'an organization or body that acts as an agent or broker in any aspect of the innovation process between two or more parties' (p.720). Thus, by charging for their services, intermediaries can considerably reduce the research and bargaining transaction costs for companies. Moreover, innovation intermediaries help companies participate in the secondary market for intellectual property.
Most of the studies on innovation intermediaries generally focus on the role of intermediaries in the innovation process (Lichtenthaler, 2005; Howells, 2006 A few studies used classifications and frameworks for intermediaries in the literature, but they mainly focused on the role and function of intermediaries (Howells, 2006; Steward 2008; (Chesbrough, 2006; Lichtenthaler & Ernst; , Lakhani et al., 2007 (Huston & Sakkab, 2007; Lakhani et al., 2007) . Only a few empirical papers have been written on open innovation intermediaries (Lakhani et al., 2007) and most of these are focused on performance (Lichtenthaler & Ernst, 2008; Howells, 2006) .
Mechanism design
Mechanism design is a sub-theme of game theory that deals with a particular class of private information game where the designer can choose the game structure and is interested in its outcome. Thus, mechanism design goals are best defined in the context of social choice -which is an aggregation of the preferences of the participants toward a single mutual decision. Mechanism design aims to devise a system to implement desired social choices or the desired choices of the owner of the system in a strategic setting where the agent preferences are private -such as in auctions (Nisan et al., 2007) . Chung and Ely (2007) analysed an auction setting where the mechanism designer can rationally choose a dominant strategy mechanism to maximise revenue. Likewise, Huang et al (2010) examined the mechanism design for e-procurement auctions where the appropriate incentive such as a bonus will lead the supplier to make more effort to deliver higher quality goods or services.
Overall, the literature of mechanism design is focused on the design of optimal mechanisms with the objective of profit maximisation (Wilson, 1993) and socially efficient mechanisms (Groves, 1973) . Within the optimal mechanisms, companies such as open innovation intermediaries lack private (member) information, so they design methods to reveal their preferences. Open innovation intermediary platforms can therefore be defined as multi-agent environments with selfinterested members. However, within the literature of mechanism design, on-line mechanisms and prediction markets are the closest mechanism models that fit with open innovation intermediary contexts due to the unclear choices of multiagent/members on online platforms. Thus a review of these literature strands will highlight the research gap that this paper addresses.
As a concept, online mechanism design was proposed by Friedman and Parkes (2003) following the study of Lavi and Nisan (2000) on truthful mechanisms in dynamic environments. With the rise of Internet, the methods of mechanism design have extended to a more dynamic environment where online mechanisms are required (Nisan et al., 2007) . In online mechanisms, information is revealed online and the decision must be made dynamically without knowledge of the future, including prospective agent types and their potential decisions (Parkes, 2007) . Thus, the basic setting of online mechanism design involves risk neutral agents that act to maximize the expected difference between its value from a sequence of decisions and its total payment while assuming that agents have quasi-linear utility functions (Parkes, 2007) . Parkes ' (2007) paper emphasises that the current literature is limited regarding the design of revenue-maximising online mechanisms in a model-based environment.
Prediction markets aim to solve the information aggregation problem by relying on the information of a large number of agents in order to predict future events (Nisan et al., 2007) . Thus, a prediction market is a mechanism designed to extract a forecast for a random variable or set of variables through aggregating knowledge and opinions about the likelihood of future actions (Pennock & Sami, 2007) . The concept roots back to the theory of rational expectations of Muth (1961) and Lucas (1972) , where empirical research on prediction markets focuses on the accuracy of prediction markets via laboratory or field testing (Pennock & Sami, 2007 , Tziralis & Tatsiopoulos, 2007 , Berg et al., 2008 . Additional studies conducted analyse financial markets (Tetlock, 2006) and the manipulation of prediction market prices (Rhode & Sctrumpf, 2006) . Pennock and Sami (2007) survey the literature on prediction markets and focus on algorithmic challenges and constraints associated with implementing a prediction market mechanism.
To our knowledge there are only few studies and frameworks that address in detail the whole range of innovation intermediaries and intermediary mechanisms. Yoo and Kim (2012) investigated the ranking mechanism design of music charts of an online digital music distributor. Likewise, Strausz (2012) and Rahman and Obara (2010) analysed mediated contracts with mechanism design. Only the study of Antikainen and Väätäjä (2008) focused on reward mechanisms in online open innovation intermediaries. Giaglis et al. (2002) focused on pricing, logistic, trust, and infrastructural mechanisms within intermediaries while analysing the role of intermediaries in electronic marketplaces. They also concluded that the role of intermediaries varies with the actual mechanism used in the platform.
In short, while both the strands of literature have been studied in depth, to our knowledge, few synergies have been found between these lines of research.
Moreover, the review of earlier research has shown that the general mechanism design of innovation intermediaries has not yet been examined. The following section describes and analyses the underlying mechanisms of online open innovation intermediaries.
Research design
We base our analysis on data collected from 51 open innovation intermediaries through: (1) primary sources such as semi-structured interviews with four intermediaries, and; (2) secondary sources such as published academic literature, official reports, and company websites. As such, there were two major activities:
a. On-line data collection: websites of the 51 intermediaries were visited and the relevant information grouped, classified, and clustered. Data collected from the interviews and secondary sources was used to perform clustering and derive the archetypes. These results were then contrasted with the insights arising from the interviews.
Characterising on-line open innovation intermediaries
The first element for characterising open innovation intermediaries is the interaction process that takes place within the platform. At one extreme, we identify an approach such as that of Atizo which fosters collaboration among participants. Others use the platform as a search tool that looks for solutions 
Broadcasting search (directed/undirected)
Probably the most immediate approach to the search problem presented by open innovation is to publish the challenge to a vast audience and hope that somebody has either developed a solution in similar or dissimilar contexts, or identify somebody with the appropriate knowledge who is willing to develop a solution. In any case, the aim is to take advantage of a large population of solvers to further exploit existing solutions that could be partially or completely applied to the problem. Consequently, the mechanism that we characterised as broadcasting search was among the first used by open innovation intermediaries and because of its highly public success stories, it has proved one of the most popular mechanisms.
In broadcasting search, companies post their problems and requirements to communities with a pre-set monetary award for the best solutions. Mostly, this problem or need is defined as a challenge. Thus, intermediaries such as
Innocentive act like knowledge brokers between 'problem seekers' (companies with problem or need) and 'problem solvers' (Lakhani, et al. 2007 ). For instance, in the case of Innocentive and NineSigma, corporate problems are posted as challenges on the platform and innovators are invited to submit their proposals.
One distinctive feature in this mechanism is that seeker companies work in consultation with the operations staff of the intermediary in the process of preparing the description and requirements of the problem or need; screening the submitted proposals; monitoring the process; or guiding the community.
Similar to the directed version of the broadcasting search mechanism, undirected broadcasting search also involves companies in the same steps of posting their requests to the community platform seeking innovations (such as ideas, patents, and innovative products and technologies). However, this variant of the mechanism does not provide any support or monitoring during the process.
Thus broadcasting search as a mechanism offers a market view of the innovation process, where externally generated solutions are matched to internal projects.
We observed that most of these intermediaries (such as Innocentive (RTP), Ideaken, Ninesigma (RTP), and Innovation Exchange) follow this type of mechanism.
Brainstorming with ranking
Broadcasting search works well when there is a clearly defined problem. However, many problems, especially when they are in the exploratory phase, are poorly defined. A mechanism that addresses this particular situation is brainstorming.
In brainstorming with ranking, companies post their problem and detailed requirements to a community and look for unexpected solutions or ideas. Ideas are generated and collected in a brainstorming phase. The best ideas are then picked and the award divided. Here the main role of community is to generate ideas through brainstorming and filter them through voting. Similarly to the undirected version of the broadcasting search mechanism, undirected brainstorming provides no support or monitoring during the process.
For instance, the 'Idea Projects' of Atizo is a service for brainstorming projects in which the main role of the Atizo community is brainstorming, generating new ideas, and filtering them online through an internal voting system. The role of the company who sponsors the 'Idea Project' is also crucial, as they need to clearly prepare a clear concept and monitor the process in order to achieve a better result. Whereas Atizo could subsist by only providing a service bridging the customer with the community and does not monitor the process. Other intermediaries (such as Openideo) provide monitoring during the brainstorming process.
Licence-out
Rather than publishing a challenge seeking possible solutions, unused solutions can also be posted seeking potential adopters who may find them of value. This is precisely the objective of the licence-out mechanism. Although a similarity with broadcasting search is evident, there remains a clear point of divergence. In this case, companies do not look for solutions, but for relevant leads that can eventually result in the use of existing solutions in new contexts.
This mechanism involves a licensing-out agreement between organisations and community members and provides companies and people with a way to publish their ideas; market-ready products; or market-ready technologies. For instance, Innoget provides a service in which companies can offer their innovations in terms of patents, ideas, innovative products, or technologies to the community. 
Connect -networking
While well defined solutions are important, companies also understand that developing their networks without an immediate objective is also worthwhile. This is why organisations not only look for solutions, but may also have an interest in communicating within their ecosystems to develop opportunities for collaboration.
Organisations seek investors, startups, partners, and customers by creating a profile with their interests and projects. However, only a few intermediaries provide such a service as it is difficult to obtain financial fees for this kind of interaction.
For instance, dotOpen is an online communication platform for organisations that works in a similar way to a LinkedIn for companies, within which decision-makers can research, discover, and contact potential clients, competitors, investors, suppliers, and other partners. The platform enables firms to find similar organisations, upload projects and interests, rate, and follow other organisations and share. Tools are being developed to improve their users' ability to strategically collaborate.
Expert groups
Expert groups have always revealed themselves to be important in the creation process; a recent example is the reliance on 'interpreters' in design driven innovation (Verganti, 2008) . Open innovation intermediaries are uniquely positioned to provide these services by connecting companies with groups of experts that could assist in validating and providing ideas that could be included in present or future strategies.
Intermediaries that implement the 'expert group' mechanism include Atizo (concept groups), Ninesigma, Big Idea Group, and Ideas to Go. These intermediaries harness the expertise of their community to solve well-defined challenges or tasks (e.g. building a prototype). The intermediary builds an expert group for a specific challenge or task, either through selecting the group members from the community or by hiring them for a position in the group.
We summarise all these mechanisms in 
An algorithmic perspective
From a formal point of view, an online open innovation intermediary is an on-line
electronic market where a number of participants endowed with a well defined utility function representing their preferences behave in a self-interested rational way and aim to optimise their utility. We term such rational self-interested participants as agents. Such an electronic market functions on the basis of established rules of conduct that can be formally described in an algorithm. Agents are motivated through a payment and we term such a solution a mechanism. 
Definition 2. (An implementation). A mechanism is an implementation with dominant strategies (in short an implementation) if for each agent
i there is a strategy such that for all possible other strategies of all other agents , maximises its utility .
Definition 3. (Mechanism design optimisation problem). In this mechanism
definition problem when given a set of possible outputs L and an objective function , termed social choice (which is concerned with relationships between individual preferences and social choice) we require an output that maximises or in the appropriate case and given a factor c, we require that any other output , A key definition in the area is incentive compatibility (also called truthfulness).
Intuitively, we say that a mechanism is truthful if agents can never gain by lying or not revealing the truth. This means that a player will prefer to tell the truth to the mechanism, rather than a possible 'lie' , because gives him greater utility. We have therefore an objective function consisting of the contribution of ideas or solutions and their associated payments. The objective of the mechanisms is to maximise the objective function and produce a selection of the best ideas diverse enough to cover all or most requirements.
Overall notable differences exist, however, in the implementation. These differences range from the level of involvement of the intermediary in the preparation of a selection of challenges to the extent that collaboration between the agents is fostered or allowed. It is therefore interesting to examine to which degree the different implementations could succeed in optimising the objective function while being incentive-compatible. Moreover, we aim to explore the conditions necessary for maximising the objective function together with the limitations imposed by each specific implementation.
Broadcasting search
The underlying mechanism of Innocentive has been studied in detail (Lakhani et al., 2009) Although innovations result from a diversity of sources and mechanisms, a prevalent and very well-known mechanism is idea recombination (Schumpeter, 1911; Hargadon, 2003) . Idea recombination is a result of interaction and many platforms explore this possibility. However, broadcasting search reduces the likelihood of this possibility by rendering solutions proposed by solvers in an entirely private manner. Hence, by dissuading recombination, it does not fully exploit the innovation potential of the community.
Proposition 2. The broadcasting search mechanism is a disincentive for the recombination of ideas.
Brainstorming with ranking
As we discussed previously, Atizo, Opeanidea, and similar intermediaries offer a platform that ranges from brainstorming to concept development and focusing on collaboration as the driving force. For this mechanism we will focus on the role of collaboration in idea generation through brainstorming, commenting, and idea ranking. is not in the best interest of the agents to rank highly or provide useful comments for the ideas of competitors. Therefore, brainstorming with a ranking mechanism is not incentive-compatible. Propositions 1 and 2 are equally applicable to the brainstorming with ranking mechanism. We supplement this with Proposition 3. 
Mechanism: Brainstorming with ranking
Licence-out
Licence-out platforms offer a unique mechanism for trading patents, innovative Both a seller and a buyer value an item for trade. However it is not in the best interest of an agent (seller) with a proposal of patents, products, or technologies and a valuation to trade if the valuation of buyer is lower than the valuation of seller . In the case of no-trade, there will be no payment. The mechanism subsidises the trade if and so it is in the best interest of j to reveal instead of so it is incentive-compatible.
Connect/ networking
A number of companies such as dotOpen, Communispace, and Inpama offer a platform that builds communities and networks of interest. This creates and requires a different mechanism.
Mechanism: Connect/networking 
Expert groups
Intermediaries such as Ninesigma provide an expert group service that has a similar mechanism as broadcasting search. Here the main difference is that a group of experts is pre-selected prior to the challenge. Similarly to the broadcasting search, it is in the best interest of agent to reveal instead of to receive a payment.
Mechanism: Expert groups
Discussion
It was observed that there is a clear difference in intermediary services; either they provide services to find potentially relevant partners or identify specific solutions with or without their corresponding implementation. Therefore it is important to understand the objective and outcome of their services so that companies and people can utilise them appropriately.
Two main axes also stand out from the previous analysis: the management of There is, however, mounting evidence that this is probably not the most appropriate type of incentive when referring to innovation. Research has found evidence that direct incentives jeopardise exploration and result in works perceived as of lower quality (Carney, 1986; Getzels, 1976) . Similar results were found in education (Deci, 2001) where the use of extrinsic incentives has always been extensive.
In Concerning innovation in the business sector, we find that some empirical evidence contradicts entrenched ideas that greater rewards lead to better performance. In fact, Ariely, Gneezy, Lowenstein and Mazar (2005) mentioned that in some contexts financial incentives can even lead to negative performance.
One of the more lucid conceptualisations of a theory that could explain this evidence comes from Teresa Amabile, who postulates that the level of creativity needed for completing a task is determinant when choosing motivators. Therefore, in algorithmic tasks (where the task steps are clear) extrinsic motivators will work effectively. By contrast, in heuristic (creative) tasks (where many possibilities must be explored), intrinsic motivators will perform better (Amabile, 1996a (Amabile, & 1996b . In her own words: 'Intrinsic motivation is conductive to creativity, extrinsic motivation is detrimental to creativity' (Amabile, 1996b, p. 119) . However, in the case of open innovation intermediaries whose focus is to pursue and foster creativity and innovation in groups, we still witness how extrinsic and not intrinsic incentives, normally in the form of monetary prizes, play the main role (See Table 2 ). Based on our interviews and analysis, we also observed that collaborative platforms present more intrinsic motives whereas non-collaborative platforms use more extrinsic motives for participation.
In addition, there is also another aspect where the type of extrinsic incentive used in the mechanism fails to align the preferences of the agents with the objectives of the platforms: namely, engaging a large number of agents. In Proposition 1 we established that the mechanisms used by open innovation intermediaries rely on the availability and engagement of a large number of solvers among whom a solution for the challenge proposed either exists or could be developed. The main incentive for attracting these solvers is, again, a prize, an extrinsic motivator.
However, when examining the existing literature on incentives for engaging crowds we again find that extrinsic motivators do not work as expected and can produce disengagement (Mellström et al., 2008) . This observation holds for both the broadcasting search and brainstorming with ranking mechanisms.
The intimate relationship between innovation and collaboration is widely accepted.
Recombining ideas has been portrayed as a key mechanism by many authors since Schumpeter (1914) , either in the form of hybridation (Hargadon, 2003) , or as cumulative innovation (Scotchmer, 2004) . In the review of Proposition 2, we established that where broadcasting search prevents recombination, brainstorming with ranking takes advantage of recombination. Therefore, there is a tension in the mechanisms between monetary incentives and benefiting from collaboration.
This tension is clearly evident when the mechanisms are analysed through the lens of mechanism design. In the previous section we described this conflict and established that while broadcasting search, expert groups, licence-out, and connect/networking are incentive-compatible, brainstorming with ranking is not compatible (See Table 3 There is a second duality in the mechanisms presented that is worth examining, the duality between autonomy and collaboration. We established that broadcasting search is a disincentive to recombination while brainstorming with ranking takes advantage of recombination. There is however, a lack of implementations that enables a smooth transition between these two extremes and mechanisms tend to lean towards one of the extremes.
There are clear benefits of collaboration in terms of enabling and fostering recombination. However, the importance of autonomy is probably not so obvious.
There is, however, plenty of recent evidence on the link between autonomy and
innovation. An empirical validation of these insights came from the work of Baard, Deci and Ryan (2004) in a study that covered a large segment of business and corroborated this link between employee autonomy and business performance.
However, at the same time we can find descriptions among the best practices of how self-organised teams emerge from autonomy, producing better and often unexpected results. The importance and emergence of self-organised teams has been studied by Parker, Wall, and Jackson (1997) . Also, in line with our discussion in the previous proposition, intrinsic motivation leads to better teams (Gagné & Deci, 2005) . However, insights on how to take advantage of these two apparently opposite practices came only recently. Girotra, Terwiesch, and Ulrich in a recent
paper ( A failure to establish ways to take advantage of both forms simultaneously can limit the efficacy of the intermediary, given the evidence that a mixed approach produces superior results.
Conclusions
Research has demonstrated a clear evolution towards increasingly mature models of intermediation. This evolution can be easily observed in contrasting the older and younger players in their relative sophistication in innovation intermediation.
Our analysis has identified a number of findings related to the structure and consequences of different innovation intermediary mechanisms. Table 4 summarises the findings of this research.
Research questions Findings
What are some main archetypes of open innovation intermediary mechanisms?
Five main archetypes: 1) broadcasting search (directed and undirected); 2) brainstorming with ranking (directed and undirected); 3) networking/connect; 4) expert group; and 5) licence-out Which specific processes are supported by these mechanisms?
 Use of monetary and other incentives/motives  Use of large number of agents or expert groups  Use of ranking system  Moderation (monitoring) by experts  Collaboration & recombination of ideas through comments
What are the underlying tensions, pitfalls, and limitations of these mechanisms?
Tensions:  between the use of monetary incentives and other incentives,  between the use of recombination of ideas while remaining incentive-compatible and autonomous,  between using a small number of experts capable of solving well defined problems and large numbers of agents that excel at solving ill-defined unclear problems
What are the consequent managerial implications for the choice and use of open innovation intermediaries?
 No collaboration and monetary prizes in broadcasting search will probably hamper creativity and the discovery of new solutions  Brainstorming with ranking provides mode innovative solutions due to collaboration  Exploratory problems should opt for mechanisms that foster collaboration at the expense of incentive-compatibility.  Complex problems could be easily adapted by an expert group.  Firms have to choose, depending on the problem, which of two drawbacks (recombination and autonomy) associated with each approach is less significant in terms of producing the best outcome. Our main finding suggests that each mechanism excels at addressing specific functions and outcomes. Broadcasting search excels at finding and then reusing existing solutions, or at finding novel and maybe unexpected uses for existing solutions. However, the seemingly small number of prizes involved, together with the absence of collaboration in the search process, may limit the discovery of novel recombinations and new social interpretations of existing technologies. A clear limitation to this mechanism is the need for a large and focused network of solvers to be able to cultivate sufficient critical mass and interest in the proposed challenge. However, this type of mechanism has very low entry barriers for solvers, offering them a genuine opportunity for making a difference and succeeding with their proposals.
Brainstorming with ranking, by contrast, seems to hold the promise of being able to develop new ideas, novel recombinations, and creative social reinterpretations of existing technologies. We have extensively discussed some of the shortcomings of this mechanism, especially when the group is small and the experts are highly aligned with the presenters of the new proposals. In this case, as in normal brainstorming, the success of brainstorming with ranking is linked to the capacity of the group to interpret and engage with the challenge. Small groups of experts are better suited to providing interdisciplinary solutions that lie within their range of expertise, while large groups may be expected to generate original and unexpected solutions.
There is, consequently, a tension between mechanisms that foster collaboration and thus idea recombination if diversity is great enough, and those that rely on developing autonomous solutions at the expense of collaboration. Firms have to choose, depending on the problem, which of these two trajectories is most appropriate for producing the desired outcome.
Highly exploratory/open problems (e.g. creating marketing concepts) that could benefit more from a diversity of viewpoints and divergent knowledge domains should opt for mechanisms that foster collaboration at the expense of incentivecompatibility. Alternatively, complex problems (e.g. solving a chemical formula)
could benefit more from finding novel applications of existing solutions that are easily adapted by experts. Other problems that are well defined and understood may benefit more from maximising the incentives for solvers by preserving incentive-compatibility -again at the expense of collaboration.
Understanding the primary mechanism behind each open innovation intermediary provides insights regarding their applicability and limitations when confronted with real-life challenges and user behaviour.
